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Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar:
Lessons for the Arab Gulf Region
JUSTIN GENGLER
Abstract: This article examines key questions of citizen-state, citizen-citizen, and citizen-
expatriate relations in the Arab Gulf states through the lens of the 2017 Qatar blockade. It
utilizes original public opinion survey data that allow examination of the embargo’s short-
term impacts on social and political relations in Qatar as well as broader trends observed
over the period from 2010 to 2019. Results lend support to some existing qualitative
accounts suggesting changes in important social and political dynamics in Qatar after the
blockade. However, survey data also show that such post-blockade differences are mostly
reflections of larger attitudinal shifts witnessed over the course of the past decade, rather
than isolated effects of the GCC crisis. This suggests the possibility that other Gulf Arab
states are experiencing similar transformations in popular sociopolitical orientations and
behavior brought on by the same long-term drivers.
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1 Introduction
The June 2017 blockade of Qatar represents a major turning point in the international relations of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and of the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
The years-long feud between Qatar and neighboring Arab countries prompted lasting shifts in trade
and migration patterns, caused the effective demise of the GCC as a vehicle for regional economic,
political, and security cooperation, and continues to serve as a significant geostrategic backdrop to
other regional contests for power within and among MENA states and their great power patrons.
Amid such far-reaching consequences, the impact of the embargo on social and political relations
inside Qatar has received understandably less attention from scholars and policymakers.
Yet a key element of the 2017 crisis was the failed attempt by blockading countries to sow
social and political discord within Qatar itself, as a means of exerting pressure on the country’s
leadership. It is thus instructive to consider the reasons for Qatar’s notable resilience to such
efforts at destabilization, separate from its ability to bear the economic costs of the embargo.
More generally, the profound shock of the Qatar blockade and its aftermath offers a unique
window into longer-term challenges that apply in degrees to all the Gulf Arab states. These
include integration of massive expatriate populations, state-driven reform of the rentier
economy away from dependence upon natural resources, accommodation of popular interest in
greater political participation, and the fashioning of coherent and inclusive nations from
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citizenries still marked by significant descent-based distinctions along tribal, confessional, and
other lines.
The present study examines these key questions of citizen-state, citizen-citizen, and citizen-
expatriate relations in the Gulf through the lens of post-blockade Qatar. The momentous and unfore-
seen nature of the embargo renders the case a rare laboratory in which to study social and political
changes spurred by the events of June 2017. Has the Qatar crisis forged a stronger bond between
citizens and between citizens and non-citizens, or instead sharpened the boundaries distinguishing
Qataris from foreigners and from one another? Has it hastened Qatar’s push toward a more diver-
sified and entrepreneurial economy, or else reinforced the existing patronage-based rentier model?
Has it inspired greater interest in political participation among citizens called upon to support their
country against outside aggression, or has it led them to prioritize security and stability over democ-
racy? Finally, to what extent do such effects and processes observed since the blockade help explain
the country’s largely unforeseen resilience in the face of the embargo? The answers to these ques-
tions afford instructive lessons about the durabilities and also vulnerabilities of GCC states as they
endeavor to overcome common systemic challenges in the coming years and decades.
The analysis to follow is informed by the results of original public opinion surveys of citizens
and residents of Qatar carried out before and after June 2017 by the Social and Economic Survey
Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University. The data allow examination into the blockade’s
short-term impacts on social and political relations as well as longer-term trends observed
during the period from 2010 to 2019. The survey results lend support to some existing qualitative
accounts suggesting changes in important social and political dynamics in Qatar after the block-
ade, such as increased inter-group trust between Qataris and non-Qataris and greater citizen inter-
est in political participation and state responsiveness. However, the data also show that such post-
blockade differences are mostly reflections of larger attitudinal shifts witnessed over the course of
the previous decade, rather than isolated effects of the GCC crisis. This suggests the possibility
that other Arab Gulf states are experiencing comparable transformations in popular sociopolitical
orientations and behavior brought about by similar underlying processes.
2 Studying the domestic side of the Qatar blockade
The June 2017 embargo of Qatar is still recent and continues to unwind, and so the relative lack of
academic studies on its domestic social and political impacts, which may take time to manifest, is
perhaps to be expected.1 It is also foremost a matter of international affairs, with wide-ranging
implications for global trade and security that can overshadow its internal consequences for
any one party to the dispute. However, assessing the effects of the blockade on societal dynamics
in Qatar is instructive for at least two reasons, one specific and another more general.
First, a central but largely forgotten aspect of the GCC crisis itself was the initial, unsuccessful
effort by blockading countries –– the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia in particular
–– to undermine popular support for the ruling Al Thani family in order to force the country’s
capitulation to their demands. The antagonists sought to create social and political conflict
inside Qatar by portraying the ruler, Amir Shaikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, as friendly to
1 Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation in a Non-Democracy:
How Qatar Withstood the 2017 Blockade”, Middle East Journal 73.3 (2019), pp. 397–416; Mitchell and
Allagui, “Car Decals, Civic Rituals, and Changing Conceptions of Nationalism”, International Journal of
Communication 13 (2019), pp. 1368–88; and some contributions in Miller (ed.), The Gulf Crisis: The
View from Qatar (2018). Restrictions on social research in the blockading countries means that, to the
author’s knowledge, no study has examined the domestic sociopolitical impacts of, or attitudes toward,
the GCC crisis in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, or Egypt.
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Arab Gulf archrival Iran, by sponsoring a token Qatari opposition in exile, by agitating the state’s
tribal support base, and by championing several contenders to the Qatari throne from margina-
lized branches of the ruling family. Of course, these efforts failed. Rather than turning against
their own government, ordinary Qataris rallied around the leadership and took to social media
and other forums to denounce and ridicule the overt attempts at external manipulation. Under-
standing how and why public opinion remained supportive carries important lessons about
state legitimacy, political participation, and nation-building in Qatar and the other autocratic
Arab Gulf states.2
More broadly, studying how Qatari society responded to the traumatic economic, social, and
political shocks brought on by the blockade offers valuable insight into larger processes of devel-
opment, contestation, and transformation taking place across the Arab Gulf region and to some
extent the wider Middle East. The June 2017 crisis saw in Qatar an unprecedented coming
together of citizens and foreign residents in support of their common home, despite longstanding
Qatari misgivings over the size and sociocultural impacts of the non-national population. It like-
wise helped to flatten enduring descent-based distinctions among Qatari citizens themselves,
creating shared symbols and spaces of civic activism, loyalty, and resistance that cut across tra-
ditional family and tribal lines.3 The blockade also opened a window of opportunity for sanc-
tioned political participation, with citizens encouraged or at least not discouraged by the state
from voicing opinions and engaging in behavior that might previously have been considered
out of place.4 Finally, the contingency of the embargo put on effective hold intended reforms
to the rentier political economic system that would have seen citizens assume greater responsibil-
ity for their financial welfare, including via once-unthinkable taxes and cuts to subsidies that have
supported Qataris and other Gulf nationals for generations.
Yet to what extent are these manifestations actual products of the blockade versus reflections of
longer-term attitudinal and behavioral change that the 2017 crisis merely brought to the fore? Did the
blockade make Qataris more accepting and appreciative of the role of non-Qataris in society, for
example, or simply present an occasion to highlight the more positive attitudes toward expatriates
that, over some period, had emerged among citizens? If the answer is the former, then the case of
post-blockade Qatar may contain relatively few lessons for other GCC states and speak instead to a
more universal question about societal resilience in the face of an existential challenge. If the answer
is closer to the latter –– if the blockade did not cause but instead spotlighted attitudinal and behavioral
change among Qataris –– then it is possible or even likely that at least some other Gulf countries are
witnessing similar transformations in state-society relations that have remained latent. To untangle
these immediate and longer-term impacts of the Qatar embargo is a primary aim of this paper.
As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, the past ten years have seen substantial
changes in the way that Qataris and non-Qataris view one another, and in the way that citizens
perceive their relationship with the state and their role in the polity. Some of these trends, particu-
larly in the political sphere, have been interrupted by dramatic exogenous events, including both
the blockade and the Arab uprisings begun in 2011. But the general directions of change are clear.
In the social domain, citizens have gradually become more accepting of Qatar’s majority non-
citizen population, particularly white-collar expats from Arab and Western nations. However,
qualitative gaps persist in Qatari tolerance and social trust of fellow nationals as compared to
Arab and especially Western and South Asian expats. In the political arena, citizen interest in
2 For more, see Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation in a Non-
Democracy”.
3 Mitchell and Allagui, “Car Decals, Civic Rituals, and Changing Conceptions of Nationalism”.
4 Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation in a Non-Democracy”.
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political participation has increased since 2010 overall, yet public enthusiasm for democratic gov-
ernance has fluctuated in key moments –– first dampened by the Arab Spring and then buoyed by
the blockade. Meanwhile, Qataris’ deference to state decision-making has declined consistently
since 2011, signaling an ever-greater willingness to oppose unpopular policies. Finally, the
decade from 2010 to 2019 has seen the Qatari citizenry grow considerably wealthier, with the
largest increases coinciding once again with the Arab Spring and the 2017 GCC crisis. This evi-
dences a continued state reliance upon economic distribution as a means of relieving or preempt-
ing political pressure, at the expense of planned structural economic reform.
3 Social relations and group trust after the blockade
The dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens has been an enduring aspect of life in the Arab
Gulf states since before independence.5 Lacking the workforce and technical expertise to admin-
ister the post-pearling oil economy, and later the post-oil knowledge economy,Qatar and other Gulf
societies have relied upon plentiful foreign labor to fill positions in the education, health, pet-
roleum, services, transportation, and other industries. Many non-citizens transition imperceptibly
into and out of the local population, remaining just long enough to fulfill a contract or meet a finan-
cial goal. But others have made the Gulf a long-term home, living there decades or even their entire
lives.6 Today, foreigners comprise just over half (an estimated 52%) of all GCC residents, with indi-
vidual country ratios ranging from a low of 38% in Saudi Arabia to 87% in Qatar and the UAE.7
The presence of such large and diverse non-indigenous populations has naturally rendered
citizenship a primary social category distinguishing “locals” from “foreigners,” as well as a fun-
damental legal category demarcating the rights and responsibilities of subjects contra those of
non-subjects. Typically, social relations between Gulf citizens and non-citizens are conceptual-
ized separately from the legal regime governing the status of foreigners –– that is, the notorious
kafala system of labor sponsorship, which restricts the entry, stay, and exit of foreigners while
denying them a path to citizenship.8 Yet these dynamics are but two sides of one theoretical
coin: the same considerations and worries that motivate Gulf states’ use of the kafala also underlie
the structural social tensions between ordinary citizens and non-citizens. Gulf governments and
Gulf nationals share concern that foreign workers may dissipate the financial resources available
for state patronage of citizens as part of the so-called “rentier bargain” of economic distribution in
return for political loyalty.9 Both also fear that foreigners may introduce outside norms and beliefs
5 See, e.g., Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait (1997); Khalaf,
AlShehabi, Hanieh, Transit States: Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf (2015); and AlShehabi,
“Policing Labour in Empire: The Modern Origins of the Kafala Sponsorship System in the Gulf Arab
States”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2019), pp. 1–20.
6 Vora, Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora (2013); Vora and Koch, “Everyday Inclusions:
Rethinking Ethnocracy, Kafala, and Belonging in the Arabian Peninsula”, Studies in Ethnicity and Nation-
alism 15.3 (2015), pp. 540–52.
7 Global Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM), “GCC: Total Population and Percentage of Nationals
and Non-Nationals in GCC Countries (National Statistics, 2017‒2018)” (2020).
8 Longva, “Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf”, Middle East Report
211 (1999), pp. 20–2; Okruhlik, “Dependence, Disdain, and Distance: State, Labor, and Citizenship in
the Arab Gulf States”, Industrialization in the Gulf: A Socioeconomic Revolution, ed. Seznec and Kirk
(2011); and Kamrava and Babar (eds), Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf (2012).
9 Mahdavy, “Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran”,
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. Cook
(1970), pp. 438‒77; Beblawi and Luciani, “Introduction”, The Rentier State, ed. Beblawi and Luciani
(1987), pp. 1–21; and Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”, World Politics 53.3 (2011), pp. 325–61.
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that change the character of traditional culture and values. Finally, Gulf rulers and citizens think
about the security implications of expatriate populations that physically outnumber locals and also
may transmit political ideas and conflicts from their home countries.
The case of Qatar illustrates well these drivers of apprehension. Upon becoming a British pro-
tectorate in 1916, Qatar possessed the Gulf region’s smallest and arguably most isolated popu-
lation. Indeed, a sticking point in treaty negotiations between the British and Qatar’s ruler
Shaikh Abdulla bin Jassim Al Thani was the former’s demand that its subjects be permitted resi-
dence in the country, with Shaikh Abdulla arguing strenuously that “the Qatari people were not
prepared to accept foreigners”.10 By the time of its first census in 1970, however, Qatar’s approxi-
mately 45,000 citizens were already a minority alongside more than 65,000 foreign residents.11
This demographic imbalance would thereafter increase exponentially until reaching its present
state of around 350,000 Qataris compared to 2.4 million non-Qataris.12 Nearly two-thirds of
the current expatriate population consists of South Asian nationals, who are employed mainly
as unskilled labor in the construction sector, while white-collar professionals from Arab and to
a lesser extent Western countries comprise most of the remainder.13
The academic literature on anti-immigrant attitudes disagrees about the root causes of the
rejection of outsiders. Theory holds that bias stems from fears over the economic threat posed
by migrants, whereas empirical evidence, including from experimental work, suggests instead
that identity factors are more influential than material factors in shaping citizens’ views.14
Without seeking to arbitrate between the two explanations, it is enough to say that both mechan-
isms appear operable in Qatar. The influence of English language and foreign norms of behavior
–– particularly Western dress and the sale of alcohol –– have been flashpoints for social activism,
with citizen criticism sometimes sparking dramatic changes in policy.15 Yet foreigners represent
for Qataris not only a sociocultural “other”, but also direct economic competition. Nine out of ten
employed citizens work in the public sector,16 and skilled migrants aspire to the same high-wage
positions in ministries and semi-governmental entities that most citizens occupy. Despite pro-
grams intended to give priority to citizen applicants, the generally higher productivity and
lower reservation wages of expats makes them comparatively attractive employees, and percep-
tions of discrimination and unfairness in hiring have been commonplace among citizens.17
A less prevalent concern in Qatar has been the effect of foreigners on security and stability.
The potential for Arab expats in particular to spread political ideologies and quarrels to Gulf
10 Quoted in Reardon-Anderson, “Emergence of the State of Qatar”, (2019), unpublished manuscript.
11 Global Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM), “Qatar: Population by Nationality (Qatari/non-
Qatari) at Dates/Years of Census (1970‒2015)” (2020).
12 Global Labour Markets and Migration, “GCC: Total Population and Percentage of Nationals and Non-
Nationals in GCC Countries”.
13 Snoj, “Population of Qatar by Nationality - 2019 Report”, Priya Dsouza Communications website, 15
August 2019.
14 E.g., Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety,
Group Cues, and Immigration Threat”, American Journal of Political Science 52.4 (2008), pp. 959–78;
Hainmueller and Hangartner, “Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimi-
nation”, American Political Science Review 107.1 (2013), pp. 159–87; Hainmueller and Hiscox, “Attitudes
Toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment”, American Pol-
itical Science Review 104.1 (2010), pp. 61–84.
15 Gengler, “The Political Costs of Qatar’s Western Orientation”, Middle East Policy 19.4 (2012),
pp. 68–76.
16 Global Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM), “Qatar: Economically Active Population Aged 15
and Above by Nationality (Qatari/Non-Qatari), Sex and Activity Sector (2017)” (2020).
17 Mitchell and Gengler, “What Money Can’t Buy: Wealth, Inequality, and Economic Satisfaction in the
Rentier State”, Political Research Quarterly 72.1 (2019), pp. 75–89.
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citizenries has been a worry of governments since the rise of Arab nationalism and later pan-
Islamic movements, and helped motivate the transition to cheaper and less politically contentious
Asian labor during the 1970s oil boom.18 Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, both
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait resorted to mass expulsion of Arab residents –– Yemenis and Palesti-
nians, respectively –– for their (or their countries’) perceived support of Iraq. The Arab Spring
protests of 2011 renewed the specter of political contagion spreading to the Gulf from elsewhere
in the Arab world via migrant populations, but those fears were not borne out. Finally, supposedly
less politicized non-Arab residents of Gulf states also have not been immune from security con-
cerns, including about their capacity for economic sabotage via strike action and their transporting
of inter-state rivalries such as that between India and Pakistan.19
The events of June 2017 have been credited in media narratives,20 and some scholarly ana-
lyses,21 for improving relations between citizens and non-citizens in Qatar. While these accounts
are largely descriptive rather than explanatory, one can identify at least two separate avenues by
which the embargo might have had such an effect. First, the sudden and serious threat posed by
the blockading countries –– militarily and later economically –– was felt equally by all residents
of Qatar and overshadowed less immediate concerns. In the initial days of the crisis, Qataris and
non-Qataris alike worried for their and their families’ physical safety, for the security of their
homes and economic assets, and for the immediate and long-term future if they were unable to
remain in the country due to war or instability. Under such circumstances, the intangible chal-
lenges posed by cultural difference, social inequality, and communal segregation doubtless lost
much of their salience. Similarly, in June 2017 the personal threat posed by economic competition
between citizens and foreigners paled in comparison to the prospect of wholesale financial col-
lapse or external expropriation of wealth resulting from the blockade.
A second manner in which the crisis may have contributed to improved citizen-expat relations
in Qatar is by offering a platform for shared civic activity in support of the embattled country.
Such activism took place online through social media as well as in the real world. Non-Qataris
joined citizens in outward signals of support for the state and for the person of the Amir, decorat-
ing their vehicles and residences with patriotic symbols, adding their signatures and well wishes
to neighborhood billboards, and participating in campaigns to purchase local products.22 That
they stayed and fought alongside Qataris against the blockade contradicted the notion of expatri-
ates as fair-weather opportunists, committed to Qatar only so long as they could easily
extract economic gain.23 Their efforts would be famously and unexpectedly acknowledged
by Amir Shaikh Tamim in his first post-blockade address to the United Nations General
Assembly, where he expressed pride “in my people and [in Qatar’s] residents”.24 Masses of
citizens and expatriates assembled at the airport to greet the Qatari leader upon his return to
18 Thiollet, “Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf: Transnational Dynamics of Migration Politics since
the 1930s”, International Migration Institute Working Paper 131 (2016), pp. 1‒25.
19 Johnston, “Authoritarian Abdication: Bargaining Power and the Role of Firms in Migrant Welfare”,
Studies in Comparative International Development 52.3 (2017), pp. 301–26.
20 Two apt illustrations are Aziz, “Qatar ‘Stronger, United’One Year after Blockade”, Al-Jazeera, 4 June
2018; and The Peninsula, “Expat Community Stands with Qatar”, 24 September 2017.
21 E.g., Mitchell and Allagui, “Car Decals, Civic Rituals, and Changing Conceptions of Nationalism”.
22 Ibid.
23 It is worth noting that the same might be said of expatriate populations on the other side of the
blockade.
24 Dharar, “Tamim al-Majd: Aʿtaz bi-shaʿbi w-al-muqimin.. wa Twitter yarud: Nahnu man naʿtaz bik”
[Tamim al-Majd: I Cherish My People and Residents.. and Twitter Replies: We Are the Ones Who
Cherish You], Al-Sharq, 19 September 2017; The Peninsula, “Emir’s Speech has Made Entire Country
Proud, Say Residents”, 20 September 2017.
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Doha.25 More recent occasions, such as Qatar’s surprise winning of the 2019 AFC Asian Cup
football championship over Saudi Arabia and the hosting United Arab Emirates, saw a repeat
of public celebrations that conspicuously involved both citizens and non-citizens.26
These and other factors give good reason to believe qualitative impressions that Qataris and
non-Qataris have emerged from the blockade enjoying a closer social bond and greater mutual
appreciation. However, the results of public opinion surveys offer, if not a contrary picture,
then a more complicated one. Qataris do indeed appear to be more accepting of foreigners
after the blockade, but this change extends back many more years to at least 2011, when the avail-
able data begin. Depicted in Figure 1 is self-reported social trust among Qatari citizens for three
different categories of residents –– those from Arab, South Asian, and Western countries, respect-
ively –– in addition to fellow citizens.27
The survey data indicate, in the first place, a wide and persistent gap in attitudes toward fellow
citizens on the one hand, and all types of expatriates, including other Arab nationals, on the other.
On a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 signifies no trust and 4 means a lot of trust, the average level of
Qatari social trust for other citizens between 2011 and 2019 is approximately 3.4. Mean trust in
Arab expatriates, by contrast, is 3.0, while that for residents from South Asian and Western
countries is lower still at about 2.3 –– or below the midpoint of the scale. Even in 2019, then,
Qatari trust in Western and especially South Asian expatriates is around a third lower than
trust in other citizens, and in substantive terms falls nearer to distrustful than trustful.
Nevertheless, the data do evidence a positive change in attitudes toward two expatriate groups
in particular, namely Arab and Western residents. From 2011 to 2019, reported Qatari trust in
Western expats increased by 23% and trust in Arab residents by 10%. The corresponding gaps
in trust for fellow citizens versus these groups also narrowed by 38% and 30%, respectively.
Figure 1: Qatari trust in different social groups, 2011‒19.28
25 Qatar Tribune, “Grand Welcome for HH Emir at Corniche Today”, 24 September 2017.
26 Al-Jazeera, “Qatar Welcomes Asian Cup Football Champions Home”, 3 February 2019.
27 Here and elsewhere, the categories “expatriates” and “residents” refer to non-Qatari white-collar pro-
fessional workers, as distinguished from unskilled blue-collar migrant laborers.
28 The source for all figures in this paper is SESRI, Qatar University.
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Meanwhile, trust in other Qataris and in residents from South Asian countries did not change stat-
istically over the past decade. The post-blockade period thus saw a continuation of a trend of
greater citizen trust in white-collar expatriates from Arab and Western backgrounds, but this posi-
tive change did not extend to predominantly Asian blue-collar workers, and it is not an isolated
effect of the 2017 crisis. These patterns suggest that Qatari acceptance of foreigners is a long-term
process based on extended inter-group contact,29 and one that other Gulf countries with similar
demographies and social dynamics may also be witnessing.30
Another way of examining post-blockade inter-group relations is to study the full matrix of
trust between Qatar’s citizen and non-citizen groupings. The preceding analysis considered
changes in Qatari trust for expat groups, but what of residents’ trust in Qataris and in each
other? Figure 2 summarizes trust for all permutations of social categories as reported in 2019.
The most obvious and notable result is that whereas all groups report relatively high levels of
trust in Qatari and Arab expatriates, this trust is not reciprocated for Western and South Asian
expatriates. For instance, 91% of Western expatriates say that they trust Qatari citizens somewhat
or highly, compared to just 65% of Qataris who say the same of Westerners. Even more dramati-
cally, a full 99% of surveyed South Asian residents report trusting Qataris, but only 54% of
Figure 2: Inter-group social trust in Qatar after the blockade (2019).
29 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954).
30 E.g., Koch, “Is Nationalism Just for Nationals? Civic Nationalism for Noncitizens and Celebrating
National Day in Qatar and the UAE”, Political Geography 54 (2016), pp. 43–53.
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Qataris trust residents from South Asian countries. This discrepancy also is true, albeit to a lesser
extent, among Arab expats in Qatar, who report lower levels of trust in Western and especially
South Asian residents as compared to these groups’ stated trust in Arab expats. Although
overall trust levels remain high, then, substantial group-based differences remain even two
years after the blockade.
4 Political orientations after the blockade
As with other domains, the 2017 GCC crisis has been cited as a turning point in citizen orien-
tations toward politics. Once the option of full-scale military takeover of Qatar was negated,
the embargoing countries turned their attention to a project of stoking political dissent among
Qataris. The campaign proceeded both directly, by questioning the legitimacy of the Amir and
organizing an opposition-in-exile, and indirectly, by seeking to undercut the state’s ability to
patronize citizens financially. Rather than turning against the leadership, however, ordinary citi-
zens rallied in defense of the political status quo, non-democratic though it may be, engaging in
online and real-world activism to an extent probably unseen in post-independence Qatar.31 The
question remains whether the blockade itself precipitated a change in political orientations
among citizens, or instead supplied a previously unavailable outlet for preexisting interest in pol-
itical participation.
One can hypothesize two different mechanisms by which the blockade might have served to
bolster popular political interest. First, the experience of making a tangible positive contribution
to the country’s security and development is a relatively rare one in the context of an ultra-rentier
welfare state such as Qatar, where it is generally the state that is expected to protect and take care
of citizens rather than vice versa. Qataris’ novel and encouraging experience with popular politi-
cal engagement after June 2017 may have instilled a newfound sense of role and purpose in the
polity that manifested in a greater interest in politics generally and/or interest in personal involve-
ment in political life.
Moreover, in the wake of the Arab Spring, Qatari and other Gulf citizens most often associate
political activism with the real prospect of instability and violent conflict, having witnessed the
disastrous outcomes of would-be revolutions across the region since 2011. In Gulf states,
popular concerns over security and stability have been linked empirically to greater political def-
erence to government decision-making, with more citizens content to remain on the political side-
lines when perceptions of internal and external threats are high.32 Qataris’ role in bolstering rather
than undermining national security through their post-blockade political action may have taught a
different, more positive lesson that altered these threat calculations, lowering the perceived risk of
engaging politically and thus encouraging individuals toward greater participation.33
Data from public opinion surveys conducted in Qatar between 2010 and 2019 give substance
to claims of increased citizen interest in politics and political involvement after 2017. Yet they
also show a more general upward trend that would appear to be as closely connected to regional
31 See Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis”.
32 Gengler, “The Political Economy of Sectarianism in the Gulf”, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Luce Foundation Paper, 29 August 2016; Gengler, “The Political Economy of Sectarianism in the
Gulf Region”, Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East, ed.
Wehrey (2017), pp. 181‒203.
33 An alternative if less persuasive explanation linking the blockade to greater citizen political interest is
the idea that Qataris attributed the GCC crisis in some large part to the government’s own unchecked
(foreign) policy decisions, and so became more active in expressing political opinions and engaging in
local politics in an attempt to shift the substantive direction of policy.
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as to domestic political developments. Figure 3 illustrates change over the previous decade in two
key attitudes: overall interest in politics and the importance attached to “living in a country that is
governed democratically”. As is plain from the figure, these two orientations have moved in
remarkable parallel since their initial measurement in 2010. Also clear from Figure 3 is that
key external events, including but not limited to the blockade, have strongly shaped Qatari orien-
tations toward politics and toward democracy, producing an uneven increase dampened by
momentous events.
Democratic orientations were first impacted by the Arab uprisings in 2011, causing citizens to
deprioritize political participation and democracy in the name of stability and boosting confidence
in Qatari state institutions.34 Over the next four years, political and democratic interest gradually
recovered before plummeting again between 2015 and 2016. The year marked Saudi Arabia’s
escalatory entry into the Yemeni civil war in March 2015, behind newly-empowered Deputy
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saʿud. June 2015 saw a deadly bombing of a Shiʿa
mosque in Kuwait by the Islamic State terrorist organization, which was near the height of its
power and threatened to extend operations throughout the Gulf countries. In September, Russia
began its own intervention in Syria’s civil war that would decisively turn the tide in favor of
the government. As one Qatari contact said of the drop in citizen political interest, “The Arab
Spring had blown up”.35
Then, in December 2015, GCC finance ministers announced an historical agreement in prin-
ciple to implement a once-unthinkable 5% value-added tax to shore up Gulf state finances
Figure 3: Political interest and importance of democracy among Qataris, 2010‒19.
34 Gengler, “Qatar’s Ambivalent Democratization”, Foreign Policy, 1 November 2011.
35 Anon. interview (Qatari), Doha, October 2019.
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following a 2014 collapse in oil prices. In a closely followed address to the Shura Council, Qatar’s
Amir surprised citizens when he warned starkly that the state could no longer afford “to provide
for everything”.36 In the ensuing weeks, the country followed other Gulf states in removing
expensive fuel and utilities subsidies and also abruptly terminated a citizen health insurance
scheme introduced just months before.37 Both geopolitically and economically, uncertainty
prevailed.
It is thus notable that the shock of the blockade had the opposite impact on Qatari orientations
toward politics. Between 2017 and 2018, the percentage of citizens who reported being very inter-
ested in politics more than doubled, from only 15% in May 2017 to 34% at the same time next
year. Interest in democracy mirrored this jump.38 That the GCC crisis lifted rather than depressed
popular interest in political participation, contrary to other exogenous events, points to external
threat perceptions as a key driver of fluctuations in Qatari political orientations. Whereas neigh-
boring violence and regional economic downturn increased the perceived risk of political action,
the embargo presented the reverse risk: that Qataris would remain inactive in the face of external
aggression and open the door to instability by appearing opposed or indifferent to the political
status quo.
Besides helping to clarify the conditions that allowed Qatari political activism to flourish after
June 2017, the survey findings arguably carry an important lesson also for other GCC states. It is
likely that there, as in Qatar, many citizens possess a latent interest in politics and in more demo-
cratic governance that is intermittently tempered or tamped down by striking outside events that
raise the predicted risk or lower the expected payoff of citizen mobilization at the individual level.
Dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs can be a powerful motivator, but the decade from
2010‒19 in the MENA region has supplied few examples of popular action leading to improved
circumstances –– and no shortage of worst-case scenarios. Under such conditions, the provision
of security and stability becomes itself a primary source of political legitimacy for the state, a fact
that Gulf governments certainly are aware of and continue to use to their advantage.39
5 Reviving the rentier state: economic distribution after the blockade
Qatar is the world’s foremost rentier state. Its small citizenry and enormous natural gas resources
give it unrivaled capacity for financial distribution, even when compared to its wealthy Gulf Arab
neighbors. In 2018, revenues from oil and gas exports equaled more than $175,000 per citizen.40
36 Quoted in Gengler and Lambert, “Renegotiating the Ruling Bargain: Selling Fiscal Reform in the
GCC”, Middle East Journal 70.2 (2016), p. 322.
37 Hertog, “The GCC Economic Model in the Age of Austerity”, The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab
Spring: Changes and Challenges, ed. Narbone and Lestra (2015), pp. 5–11; Krane, “The Political Economy
of Subsidy Reform in the Persian Gulf Monarchies”, The Economics and Political Economy of Energy Sub-
sidies, ed. Strand (2016), pp. 191–223; and Krane, “Political Enablers of Energy Subsidy Reform in Middle
Eastern Oil Exporters”, Nature Energy 3.7 (2018), pp. 547‒52. Cancellation of the insurance program is
cited in Gengler and Lambert, “Renegotiating the Ruling Bargain”.
38 As is visible in Figure 3, the close correspondence between increased political interest and increased
democratic interest appears to break down between 2018 and 2019: the former retreats while the latter per-
sists at the same high level. This may indicate a disconnect between heightened democratic aspirations and
actual opportunity for formal political participation after the blockade. Additional data from subsequent
periods will be necessary to confirm the existence and significance of this potential divergence.
39 E.g., Al-Rasheed, “Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring”,
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11.3 (2011), pp. 513–26; Brumberg, “Transforming the Arab
World’s Protection-Racket Politics”, Journal of Democracy 24.3 (2013), pp. 88–103.
40 Revenue estimates taken from International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map, “List of Exporters for the
Selected Product - Product: 2709 Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude”
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The state allocates a generous portion of this income to Qataris via an extensive system of welfare
benefits, including a near-guaranteed position in the public sector, a land allotment, low-interest
home construction loan, free education and health services, and other subsidies and allowances.41
In line with the expectations of rentier state theory, Qatar features extremely low levels of political
contestation. The country’s only elected deliberative body is the advisory Central Municipal
Council, whose members give suggestions on local affairs to the Ministry of Municipality and
Environment. An appointed Shura Council also serves a mainly advisory function, although it
enjoys some influence over domestic policy via its nominal control of the general budget.42
Despite Qatar’s affluence, and corresponding political stability, it is still vulnerable to outside
economic forces. Its ability to generate government revenue depends on natural resources that are
depletable andmust be sold on volatile international markets.When global energy prices fall below
the fiscal break-even point for Qatar and other GCC states, they can no longer pay for the expensive
welfare systems that support citizens as well as the larger rentier political-economic model. Down-
turns in oil markets thus create both financial and political difficulties for Gulf governments.
Enter the oil crash that began in summer 2014. Oil prices would hit their lowest point in a
decade at around $27 per barrel, down from an average of $100 over the prior three years. The
International Monetary Fund projected a $1 trillion shortfall in GCC budgets under a scenario
of low oil prices and no structural reform of the rentier economy, whose balance sheets had bal-
looned with massive social spending meant to counteract the Arab Spring uprisings.43 By 2016,
Qatar faced its first deficit in fifteen years, and had joined the rest of the GCC in announcing and
swiftly implementing radical policy changes to reduce the budget shortfall.44 Measures included
an overnight end to fuel subsidies, an increase to water and electricity prices, and a new GCC-
wide 5% value-added tax (VAT) on goods and services that challenged a fundamental tenet of
the authoritarian rentier bargain: the reverse principle of no taxation, so no representation.45
Finally, Gulf rulers advised citizens that, unlike during previous downturns, such rentier retrench-
ment did not signify a temporary austerity but rather the new normal.46
Until now, analysis of the role of economics in insulating Qatar from the effects of the 2017
blockade has focused on the state’s proactive commercial and monetary policies.47 Qatar
promptly found new trading partners to replace the blockading countries, incubated the rise of
indigenous industries to supplement imports in some sectors, and drew from an estimated
$335 billion sovereign wealth fund to provide liquidity to banks and forestall a run on the
Qatari currency instigated by the embargoing countries.48 However, beyond what Qatar did do
(2019), see: “ITC: Exports of Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude (Code
2709)”; and “ITC: Exports of Petroleum Gas and Other Gaseous Hydrocarbons (Code 2711)”.
41 Mitchell, Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar, PhD diss. (2013).
42 Government Communications Office, Qatar, “Shura Council” (2020).
43 Parasie, “As Oil Profits Plunge Gulf Regimes Weigh the Unmentionable: Taxes”, The Wall Street
Journal, 10 February 2016.
44 Gengler; Shockley; and Ewers, “Refinancing the Rentier State: Welfare, Inequality, and Citizen Pre-
ferences toward Fiscal Reform in the Gulf Oil Monarchies”, Comparative Politics (2020).
45 Vandewalle, “Political Aspects of State Building in Rentier Economies: Algeria and Libya Com-
pared”, The Rentier State: Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, vol. 2, ed. Beblawi and
Luciani (1987), pp. 173‒85.
46 Gengler and Lambert, “Renegotiating the Ruling Bargain”.
47 E.g., Collins, “Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure”, Rice University’s Baker Insti-
tute for Public Policy Issue Brief (2018), pp. 1‒8.
48 England and Kerr, “Qatar’s Wealth Fund Brings $20bn Home to Ease Impact of Embargo”, Financial
Times, 18 October 2017. For more on Qatar’s economic response to the blockade, see Wright, “The Political
Economy of the Gulf Divide”, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Krieg (2019), pp. 145‒59.
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economically in the wake of the crisis, also critical is what it did not do: namely, it deferred
implementation of the key fiscal reform measures decided after the 2014 oil crash, including
most importantly the 5% VAT. One expects that Qatar’s decision aimed in part to distance
itself politically from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who were the main architects of the GCC
reform agenda and duly went forward with austerity plans notwithstanding the Qatar dispute.
The decision also likely reflected a different sort of political calculation, that saving Qataris
from unwelcome economic changes would provide a boost to public opinion at a time when
the state needed popular support.
The upshot is that rather than suffering financially from the embargo, in fact the average
Qatari household saw its economic situation improve after June 2017. Apart from the pre-block-
ade increase in fuel prices, no new major austerity measures were imposed. Meanwhile, the uncer-
tainty of the crisis likely motivated many citizens to join the labor market, including previously
non-working Qatari females, as protection against inflation or lost business or investment income.
Finally, it is possible that the state’s repatriation of at least $20 billion in sovereign wealth fund
assets –– equivalent to 12% of Qatar’s total 2017 GDP –– had the effect of a monetary stimulus,49
injecting cash into the economy that eventually found its way to citizens through existing chan-
nels of rentier patronage.
This result is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts the distribution of total household income
among Qataris as measured in May 2017 and May 2018, respectively. The survey data show a
marked shift from lower income categories to higher income categories over this twelve-month
span. In 2017, 62% of citizens reported total household income of more than 40,000 Qatari
riyals (∼$11,000) per month. By 2019, this proportion had risen to 76%, representing a 23% rela-
tive increase. Other SESRI survey data collected over the same period show a similar jump in
household income. Notably, there was no other change in reported Qatari income either
between May 2014 and May 2017 or again between May 2018 and May 2019. This suggests
that it is the blockade, rather than a more general upward trend, that accounts for the increase.
That average citizen income did not increase in the three years prior to the blockade means
that the last significant growth in Qatari wealth most probably took place after September
2011, when the government surprised citizens with a 60% pay increase for public sector employ-
ees, doubled to 120% for those working in the police and military.50 The move was widely inter-
preted as an attempt to preempt citizen discontent at the height of the Arab Spring. It would be
better described as a reward for Qataris’ conspicuous lack of enthusiasm from the outset of the
revolts. Whatever the characterization, the fact remains that the regional political earthquakes
of 2011 and 2017 have undoubtedly coincided with a deepening of the rentier state in Qatar.
In each case, citizens have emerged more affluent but also more dependent upon government lar-
gesse, while the latter has refrained from implementing planned structural reforms designed to
ensure the long-term sustainability of the resource-based economy and polity. For now, citizens
and leaders appear content to preserve Qatar’s winning formula.
6 Conclusion: societal change in Qatar and the wider GCC
How has the blockade of Qatar altered relations within society and between society and the state?
This question has been less frequently investigated compared to the numerous international
dimensions of the GCC conflict, but it is no less significant –– both for what it teaches about
Qatar specifically and its potential lessons for the other Arab Gulf states. This study has leveraged
49 England and Kerr, “Qatar’s Wealth Fund”.
50 Gengler, “The Political Costs”.
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rare nationally representative survey data collected in Qatar before and after the June 2017 crisis
to offer some empirically-backed answers. The analysis supported some common anecdotal
impressions about changes in domestic social and political relations due to the embargo, but it
has qualified or contradicted others.
The findings demonstrated, first, that the embargo did not give rise to a new era of mutual
social trust and acceptance between the distinct social groupings in Qatar, as supposed in some
qualitative accounts. Rather, the post-blockade period saw continued incremental improvement
in social relations that began at the beginning of the decade or earlier. Moreover, such improve-
ment has not extended to all groups of people. Qatari trust in fellow citizens, for instance, has not
increased overall during the period from 2010–19, although it remains much higher than trust in
any expatriate group. Neither have there been improvements during this time in the perceptions of
Qataris and non-Qatari Arabs toward blue-collar workers from the Indian subcontinent. The most
significant increase in trust witnessed over the ten years considered here is that of Qataris and
other Arabs toward expatriates from Western countries, which in 2011 was substantially lower
than trust in any other group measured in the survey. This situation remained until the last pre-
blockade data point in 2014, with Qatari trust in Westerners surpassing trust in South Asian resi-
dents only by 2019. Nonetheless, in relative terms Qatari and Arab views of non-Arab expats ––
Asian and Western –– continue to lag considerably behind.
A largely analogous result obtained when survey data were used to investigate the idea that
the blockade caused an unprecedented spike in Qatari interest in politics and in popular invol-
vement in politics. Analysis of changes in political interest over 2010–19 suggests an under-
lying upward trend, yet one that is highly sensitive to, and has repeatedly been suppressed
by, worry over potential instability and threat following momentous external shocks. Here
the 2017 crisis is unique in having had the reverse effect on Qatari orientations, bolstering
rather than depressing citizen interest in politics and in democratic governance. This paper
argued that the reason Qatari citizens embraced post-blockade political activism is precisely
because they viewed it as a stabilizing force in the face of outside aggression. In other
Figure 4: Total Household Income among Qataris, May 2017 vs. May 2018.
Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar 251
words, the blockade taught Qataris the opposite lesson from the Arab Spring and other recent
examples, that popular political mobilization need not necessarily beget chaos and can in fact
play a very positive role in preserving the polity.
Finally, the data revealed a previously underappreciated economic impact of the Qatar
embargo: the reinvigoration of the rentier state. Whereas Qatar had joined other GCC countries
in promising fundamental changes to the traditional welfare model in light of the 2014 collapse
in oil prices, the contingency of the blockade led to a deferral of the majority of the unpopular
austerity measures, including most notably the introduction of general taxation. This had the
effect not simply of insulating citizens from economic damage due to the crisis, but actually
improving the financial situation of the average Qatari household. The state’s practical suspension
of the rentier reform agenda, combined with its repatriation of tens of billions of riyals in foreign-
invested assets, acted as a net wealth transfer to the citizen population. This is reflected in the
survey data, which indicates a spike in reported household income around the time of the block-
ade not seen since the government’s 60% Qatari pay raise enacted in 2011 after the onset of the
Arab Spring.
That many of the social and political effects commonly attributed to the Qatar blockade are
in reality reflections of longer-term developments in the country on display since at least the
start of the 2010s, is in one sense perhaps an anticlimactic conclusion. Yet in another
respect, the result is a more exciting one, as it means that the changes observed in Qatar
are not one-off products of an exogenous crisis but may be generalizable to other Arab Gulf
states. Relations between Qataris and non-Qataris did not improve after June 2017 because
the country was under imminent external threat, but because, over some lengthy period of
time, trust between (certain) social groupings had already begun to turn more positive. Like-
wise, Qataris did not become more interested in politics and democracy after the blockade;
rather, the dynamics of the crisis –– in which citizen activism played an important role in
securing the country –– alleviated citizens’ overriding concern that organized expressions of
popular political interest might devolve into the sort of violent disorder seen across the
Middle East and North Africa since 2011.
The results discussed in this study thus take on a wider significance for the Gulf region as a
whole, where comparable efforts to manage social integration, political participation and
accommodation, rentier retrenchment, and nation-building are ongoing. Substantively, the find-
ings from Qatar highlight some regional success stories, including the gradual if slow pro-
gression toward citizen acceptance of white-collar expatriates who represent at once an
economic and cultural challenge, and the capacity of Gulf citizens to overcome fears of desta-
bilizing their comparatively peaceful and comfortable countries through concerted political
mobilization and activism. Other takeaways are less positive. The state’s tendency to fall
back on economic benefaction as an antidote to perceived political strain is a testament to
the resilience of the rentier system. Rentier retrenchment has not been limited to Qatar, with
Kuwait and Oman also delaying implementation of the 5% VAT until at least 2021,51 and
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia rolling back some subsidy reforms in response to public pressure.52
One expects that the other long-term changes in social and state-society relations examined
here will also proceed in fits and starts.
51 Reuters, “Kuwait to Postpone VAT Implementation to 2021, Says Parliament Committee”, 15 May
2018; Barbuscia, “Oman to Delay VAT to 2021 Amid Sluggish Growth”, Reuters, 30 July 2019.
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